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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
DERR V. STATE: AN EXPERT'S RELIANCE ON DNA 
ANALYSIS DID NOT OFFEND THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING REPORT WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY FORMAL TO BE CONSIDERED 
TESTIMONIAL. 
By: James Hetzel 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the defendant's right to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment ("Confrontation Clause") was not 
invoked when the State presented expert testimony based on DNA testing not 
performed by the expert because the testing in question lacked the requisite 
formality to be "testimonial." Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 73 A.3d 254 
(2013). The court further held that a defendant's statutory and constitutional 
discovery rights were not violated when the trial judge refused to order 
production of coincidental matches in the FBI's Combined DNA Index 
System ("CaDIS"), as the State was not required to create potentially 
exculpatory evidence for the defendant. Id at 97-98, 73 A.3d at 259. The 
court finally concluded that the DNA evidence presented was sufficient to 
sustain the defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to use the defendant's proposedjury instruction. Id 
In December of 1984, an unknown man attacked and raped a woman in 
Charles County, Maryland. Following the rape, the victim was transported 
to a hospital where medical personnel used a rape kit to collect biological 
evidence. The collected evidence was sent to the FBI for testing, but the 
case remained unsolved and became inactive. In 2002, the evidence was 
resubmitted to the FBI for additional analysis, and the newly generated DNA 
profile was entered into CaDIS. Two years later, Derr's existing profile in 
CaDIS was matched to the DNA profile generated from the rape kit. Derr 
was subsequently indicted by a Charles County Grand Jury for the 1984 
attack. 
In 2006, Derr was tried in the Circuit Court for Charles County for several 
counts of rape and sexual offense. At trial, the State presented Jennifer 
Luttman ("Luttman") to testify as an expert in forensic serology and DNA 
analysis. Luttman outlined, among other things, background information 
regarding DNA analysis, testing procedures, and the creation of DNA 
profiles. Luttman and her team were involved in conducting DNA profile 
comparisons, and some of the testing in the instant case was performed by 
Luttman's team. She acknowledged, however, using the "bench work" of 
others to aid in making a final assessment regarding the present case. The 
testimony by Luttman was introduced over Derr's objection. 
Derr was convicted of first and second degree rape and first and second 
degree sexual offense, and appealed to the court of Special Appeals of 
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Maryland, challenging his conviction. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari on its own motion before the intermediate appellate court 
rendered a decision, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
decision of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial. The State then 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari and requested that 
the petition be held pending until the Court decided Williams v. Illinois. 
(Later cited as Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.2221 (2013).) In 2012, the 
Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari, vacating the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland and remanding in light of 
Williams. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by addressing whether preventing 
Derr from questioning the creators of the DNA reports, which Luttman relied 
upon in her testimony, violated the Confrontation Clause. Derr, 434 Md. at 
103, 73 A.3d at 266. The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal 
defendant with the right to confront witnesses who testify against him or her 
and "only applies when an out-of-court statement constitutes testimonial 
hearsay." Id. at 103-06, 73 A.3d at 265-66 (citing Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 
642, 28 A.3d 687, 694 (2011); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004)). The critical inquiry was whether the statement was "testimonial" 
and whether it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Derr, 434 
Md. at 107, 73 A.3d at 265. 
The court determined that to be "testimonial" under the Confrontation 
Clause, an out-of-court statement must be sufficiently formalized. Derr, 434 
Md. at 111-12, 73 A.3d at 267-68 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.2221 
(2013)). The court concluded that although in Williams there was no 
majority opinion, the controlling standard was the position taken by five 
Justices, which "require [ ed] that a statement be, at a minimum, formalized to 
be testimonial." Derr, 434 Md. at 115, 73 A.3d at 270 (determining that 
under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), where there was a 
fragmented decision, the holding could be viewed as the position of the 
Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds). 
The court found that the DNA reports, which were the basis for Luttman's 
opinion, were not "testimonial" because they lacked the requisite formality. 
Derr, 434 Md. at 118, 73 A.3d at 272. The reports lacked formality because 
they had no certifications regarding their procedures or accuracy. Id. at 119, 
73 A.3d at 272. Therefore, since the statements were not "testimonial," the 
Confrontation Clause was not implicated. Id. 
Having determined there was no Confrontation Clause violation, the court 
next addressed Derr's discovery rights. Derr, 434 Md. at 121, 73 A.3d at 
273-74. In a pre-trial motion that the trial court subsequently denied, Derr 
requested that the State be compelled to produce statistics on the probability 
of coincidental matching DNA profiles occurring within CaDIS. Id On 
appeal, Derr argued that the denial precluded him from proving any potential 
errors in the reports. Id. The court held that "the trial court's refusal to order 
the FBI to conduct a research project and create potentially useful evidence 
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for Derr [did] not violate either his constitutional right to discovery, as 
defmed by Brady and its progeny, or Maryland Rule 4-263." Id. at 124, 73 
A.3d at 275. 
Derr further argued that "there was insufficient evidence as a matter of 
law to sustain [his] convictions" because the DNA evidence identifying him 
was faulty. In examining the sufficiency of evidence, the court explained 
that it looked to whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt," deferring to any inferences 
made. Id. at 129, 73 A.3d at 278 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
319 (1979». The court determined a rational juror could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Derr was indeed the victim's attacker, therefore the 
State had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Derr, 434 
Md. at 131, 73 A.3d at 280. 
Additionally, the court held that the trial court's refusal to give Derr's 
requested jury instruction was not erroneous. Derr, 434 Md. at 134, 73 A.3d 
at 281. The court noted that proposed instructions need not be given where 
the jury instructions protect the defendant's rights and cover the theory of the 
defense. Id. (citing Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 368-69, 10 A.3d 184, 189 
(2010». Here, the court determined the jury instructions passed this test by 
instructing the jury members that it was their right to determine the weight 
and credibility of the evidence. Derr, 434 Md. at 134, 73 A.3d at 281. 
The dissent took issue with the court's Confrontation Clause analysis, and 
noted the troubling fact that only one member of the Williams Court voted 
for a characterization of "testimonial" that was eventually adopted by the 
Derr majority. Derr, 434 Md. at 140, 73 A.3d at 285 (Eldridge, J., 
dissenting). The dissent further pointed out that the Williams decision 
ordered the Maryland and Federal provisions to be considered separately, yet 
the court did not do so. Id. at 143-46, 73 A.3d at 286-89 (Eldridge, J., 
dissenting). Therefore, rather than attempting to interpret and apply the 
fragmented Williams decision, the dissent simply would have elected to 
decide Derr solely on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 141, 73 A.3d at 285 
(Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
In Derr v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
Confrontation Clause was not violated by expert testimony that relied upon 
DNA reports which the expert did not personally compile. Thus, the State 
may potentially shield questioning of those who conduct underlying reports 
if they are kept informal. Further, while the policy of not forcing the State to 
produce evidence for defendants is certainly logical, and perhaps fiscally 
responsible, the decision of the court is problematic in that it makes 
challenging DNA testing increasingly difficult for Maryland practitioners in 
cases where DNA testing is at issue. 
